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ABSTRACT

This study examined men's and women's attitudes toward the sexes, underlie these attitudes, and the ambivalence of this evaluative content. Male (N=162) and female (N=162) college students evaluated the social category of women or men on several types of measures: a semantic differential measure of attitudes, a free-response measure of beliefs, a free-response measure of emotions, a list of beliefs measure, and a list of emotions measure. Analysis of subjects' attitudes toward the sexes and of the evaluative content of their beliefs established that they evaluated women more favorably than men. In addition, analysis of subjects' emotional reactions toward women and men did not yield evidence of negativity toward women at the emotional level. Nor did it appear that subjects' very positive evaluation of women masked ambivalence toward them. The findings provide strong evidence that women are evaluated quite favorably--in fact, more favorably than men are evaluated. (Five pages of references, author notes, footnotes, and a data table are included.) (Author/NB)

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Are Women Evaluated More Favorably than Men?

An Analysis of Attitudes, Beliefs, and Emotions

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Abstract

In an experiment in which male and female subjects evaluated the social category of women or men on several types of measures, analysis of subjects' attitudes toward the sexes and of the evaluative content of their beliefs established that they evaluated women more favorably than men. In addition, analysis of subjects' emotional reactions toward women and men did not yield evidence of negativity toward women at the emotional level. Nor did it appear that subjects' very positive evaluations of women masked ambivalence toward them. This research therefore provides strong evidence that women are evaluated quite favorably--in fact, more favorably than men are evaluated.

Are Women Evaluated More Favorably than Men?

An Analysis of Attitudes, Beliefs, and Emotions

Evaluations of women and men have been a focus of interest in gender research for many years (see Deaux & Kite, 1987). The nearly universal assumption in these discussions is that women are evaluated less favorably than men. For example, Matlin (1987) wrote that "By the time they reach adulthood, most women agree with most men that males are superior" (p. 269), and Lips (1988) maintained that "Not only are males viewed as different from females; they are viewed as superior to them" (p. 8).

To support their claim that women are negatively evaluated, some textbook writers rely in part on informal, qualitative appraisal of depictions of women in literature, mythology, and religion (e.g., Hyde, 1985; Williams, 1987). Most writers invoke social scientific evidence as well, but some of this evidence is quite indirect. For instance, some discussions imply that data documenting discrimination against women and women's disadvantaged social position demonstrate that people evaluate women less favorably than men (e.g., Greenglass, 1982; Matlin, 1987). Such reasoning assumes a direct correspondence between people's evaluations of the sexes and complex societal phenomena such as the disparity between men's and women's wages. Although evaluations of women may be one part of a network of causes affecting women's social position, psychologists should not assume that discrimination or disadvantage necessarily reveal negative attitudes or stereotypes (see Stroebe & Insko, 1989).

Research on the Evaluative Content of Gender Stereotypes

When writers on gender have provided more direct empirical evidence that women are negatively evaluated (e.g., O'Leary, 1977; Lips, 1988), the proof most commonly cited

is the research on gender stereotypes carried out by Rosenkrantz, Broverman, and their colleagues (e.g., Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968). These investigators examined the traits that people typically ascribe to women and men. Although this research did not find a difference in the average desirability of the traits ascribed to women (i.e., female-valued or feminine traits) and those ascribed to men (i.e., male-valued or masculine traits), they reported that a larger number of masculine than feminine traits were evaluated positively by subjects. In addition, when these researchers had mental health workers describe a mature, healthy, socially competent man, woman, and adult, descriptions of the adult and the man were similar to one another and different from descriptions of the woman (Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, & Vogel, 1970). This finding as well as the ascription of a larger number of positive traits to men have typically been interpreted as indicating that women are perceived less favorably than men.

Investigators have subsequently questioned whether this research provides strong evidence that the stereotype of women is more negative than that of men. The numbers of positive traits assigned to women or men may reflect peculiarities of researchers' criteria for selecting these traits, and, moreover, the average evaluations of the masculine and feminine traits that are selected may be a better indicator of their value than the numbers of these traits (see Del Boca, Ashmore, & McManus, 1986). In addition, Widiger and Settle (1987) showed that Rosenkrantz et al.'s (1968) selection of a smaller number of traits favoring women produced the apparently greater similarity of mentally healthy men and mentally healthy adults. Had the Rosenkrantz et al. stereotype

measure been constructed to include more female-valued than male-valued traits, women would have been judged more similar to adults and thus would have appeared more competent and mature than men. Also, Del Boca et al.'s (1986) review, which encompassed additional research on the evaluative content of stereotypes (e.g., McKee & Sherriffs, 1957; Williams & Bennett, 1975), pinpointed further methodological difficulties and suggested that evidence for more negative evaluations of women than men is quite mixed. Finally, the majority of the research on the content of gender stereotypes has not determined the evaluative meaning of this content (e.g., Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984).

Improved Methods for Investigating the Evaluation of Women and Men

Stronger methods can be applied to assess the evaluative content of stereotypes about social groups (see Ashmore, Del Boca, & Wohlers, 1986, and Del Boca et al., 1986). To avoid some of the most problematic features of past efforts, researchers should have each respondent (a) report the attributes that he or she personally ascribes to a social group, (b) estimate the probability that group members have each attribute, and (c) evaluate each of these attributes. This method allows each respondent to give his or her personal stereotypes of women and men and thus avoids creating arbitrary lists of masculine and feminine traits. Moreover, this method allows the evaluative content of stereotypes to be estimated for each subject by the computation of Probability X Evaluation products for each trait that he or she nominates (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).

Although the evaluation of the sexes has been investigated primarily in stereotype studies, measurement of attitudes toward the sexes is also relevant, when attitude is understood as a tendency to ascribe some degree of favorable or unfavorable meaning to

a target group. Therefore, attitudes toward the sexes can be compared, provided they are assessed by a method that yields a common metric (e.g., the semantic differential; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957).

In a study using such methods, Eagly and Mladinic (1989) assessed subjects' attitudes toward men and women and also examined the evaluative content of their beliefs about the sexes (i.e., their stereotypes). Although the main purpose of this research was to show that attitudes toward women and men are positively related to stereotypes concerning the sexes, the study produced the serendipitous findings that both attitudes and beliefs were more positive in relation to women than men. Yet these findings should not be regarded as definitive. One limitation of this research is Eagly and Mladinic's use of a within-subjects design, with all subjects evaluating four target groups: women, men, Democrats, and Republicans. Demand characteristics in such a design might have sensitized subjects to the fact that their relative evaluations of the sexes were under study and thereby biased their judgments (Greenwald, 1976). Moreover, only Eagly and Mladinic's attitudinal data indicated that both female and male subjects evaluated women more positively than men. Whereas women's more favorable evaluation of women than men was significant on all measures, men's more favorable evaluation of women was significant only on the attitude measure. These considerations thus suggest that the hypothesis that women are evaluated more favorably than men should be tested with a between-subjects design, to determine whether Eagly and Mladinic's serendipitous findings are robust.

New Issues: Emotions toward Women and Men and the Ambivalence of Beliefs and Emotions

The disparity between Eagly and Mladinic's (1989) findings and the claims of many writers on gender suggests that an even wider variety of methods should be used to probe subjects' evaluations of the sexes. Consistent with the idea that affect or emotions, as well as cognitions or beliefs, can underlie attitudes (see Katz & Stotland, 1959; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960; Zanna & Rempel, 1988), assessment of subjects' emotional reactions to the sexes is appropriate. Emotional responding, which could be considered a more covert and less consciously controlled form of evaluation, might reveal negative feelings toward women, even when cognitive responding reveals that relatively positive attributes are ascribed to women. This possibility is consistent with Abelson, Kinder, Peters, and Fiske's (1982) argument that affective reactions are less "semantically filtered" than beliefs and reflect motivation more directly (p. 620). Therefore, the present experiment included assessment of respondents' emotional reactions to women and men.

Finally, the ambivalence of people's cognitive and emotional reactions to women and men should be examined. One way to reconcile claims that women are negatively evaluated with contradictory claims that they are positively evaluated is to assume that people are particularly ambivalent about women. Thus, some aspects of reactions to women may be positive and other aspects negative. Depending on whether predominantly positive or predominantly negative reactions are activated, an individual's overall evaluation of women could be favorable or unfavorable.

In the present study men's and women's attitudes toward men and women were measured along with (a) the evaluative content of the beliefs and emotions that may underlie these attitudes and the (b) ambivalence of this evaluative content. Although the belief measures assess the familiar construct of gender stereotypes, the emotion measures assess a form of responding that has not been previously examined in research on evaluations of women and men.

Method

Subjects

A total of 324 students (162 men, 162 women) participated to fulfill a psychology course requirement at Purdue University. Subjects' mean age was 19.45 years.

Procedure

A male or a female experimenter administered a questionnaire to the subjects in groups of approximately 20. The questionnaire included five types of instruments for assessing attitudes, beliefs, and emotions related to one of four target groups--women, men, members of the Democratic Party, and members of the Republican Party. Democrats and Republicans were included to provide comparative data on attitudes toward other social groups. On the first of the five instruments, which assessed attitudes, each subject rated the target group and the following additional groups: prostitutes, Europeans, rapists, clowns, soldiers, Latin Americans, teenagers, alcoholics, tennis players, and grandparents. On the subsequent instruments, subjects responded only to the target group. The second and third instruments were free-response measures, which assessed individually-held beliefs or emotions by having subjects list attributes typical of the target group on one instrument and list emotions they typically felt toward this group

on the other instrument. The fourth and fifth instruments, which provided supplementary measures, had subjects rate the target group on a list of beliefs on one instrument and on a list of emotions on the other instrument. The second and third instruments were counterbalanced, as were the fourth and fifth instruments: Half of the subjects completed the belief instrument first, and half completed the emotion instrument first. Subjects indicated their sex and age, but not their name.

Instruments

Semantic differential measure of attitudes. Subjects rated each group on five 7-point semantic differential scales: good-bad, positive-negative, valuable-useless, pleasant-unpleasant, and nice-awful. Each scale was scored from +3 to -3, and attitudes were represented by each subject's mean response on the five scales. Coefficient alpha was .80 for women, .82 for men, .92 for Democrats, and .94 for Republicans.

Free-response measure of beliefs. Subjects wrote down up to ten characteristics that they believed were typical of members of the target group. After completing this task, subjects indicated the strength of their association between the group and each characteristic by estimating the percentage of people in each group (e.g., women) who have each characteristic (e.g., who are "warm," if a subject listed this attribute). Subjects then rated each characteristic (e.g., "warm") listed for the group on a 7-point good-bad scale, which we scored from +3 to -3, with 0 assigned to the middle category. The percentages subjects indicated for each characteristic were transformed to proportions. Each characteristic's proportion was multiplied by its good-bad rating, and these products were averaged across the characteristics listed.[1] Positive scores on this composite measure thus indicated a favorable evaluation of the target group (i.e., predominately

positive attributes ascribed to group members), and negative scores indicated an unfavorable evaluation (i.e., predominately negative attributes ascribed to group members).

Free-response measure of emotions. Subjects wrote down up to ten emotions that they typically felt toward the members of the target group. After completing this task, subjects indicated the strength of their association between the group and each emotion by estimating the percentage of people in each group (e.g., women), among those they had known, who had caused them to experience each emotion (e.g., "nervous," if a subject listed this emotion).[2] Finally, subjects rated each emotion (e.g., "nervous") listed for the group on the good-bad scale described in the preceding paragraph. Paralleling the procedure for assessing the evaluative content of subjects' beliefs, we assessed the evaluative content of subjects' emotions by averaging the Probability × Evaluation products for each subject's reactions to the target group. Thus, each emotion's percentage was transformed to a proportion and multiplied by its good-bad rating; these products were averaged across the emotions listed.

List of beliefs measure. To compare the free-response measure of beliefs with the type of measure more typically used by researchers, we had subjects rate the target group on a list of 32 traits. This list was created by selecting a representative sample from Peabody's (1987) classification of a large pool of traits. Half of the traits were positive, and half were negative.[3] Following the procedure we used for our free-response measures, subjects indicated the percentage of people in each group who have each characteristic. After performing this task for the target group, subjects evaluated each of the 32 traits on the good-bad scale. In the computation of the composite evaluative

measure for each group, the procedure described in the preceding paragraphs for the free-response measures was modified by transforming subjects' percentages to a -.5 to .5 bipolar scale (on which 100% had a value of .5, 50% a value of 0, and 0% a value of -.5).[4] Positive scores on this composite measure thus indicated a favorable evaluation (i.e., high percentages of group members having positive attributes and low percentages having negative attributes). Negative scores indicated an unfavorable evaluation (i.e., high percentages of group members having negative attributes and low percentages having positive attributes). Coefficient alpha for the set of Probability X Evaluation items was .87 for women, .86 for men, .92 for Democrats, and .90 for Republicans. The correlations between this measure of the evaluative content of traits and the free-response measure were .60 for women, .41 for men, .64 for Democrats, and .79 for Republicans.

List of emotions measure. To compare the free-response measure of emotional responses with more typical measures of emotions, we had subjects rate their reactions to members of the target group on a list of 32 emotions. This list was created by selecting the emotions that are most commonly included on standard measures of mood or affect (Abelson et al., 1982; Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). Half of the emotions were positive, and half were negative. Subjects indicated the percentage of people in each group, among those they had known, who had caused them to experience each emotion. After performing this task for the specified group, subjects evaluated each of the 32 emotions on the good-bad scale. The computation of the composite evaluative measure for each group followed the procedure described in the preceding paragraph for the list of traits measure. Coefficient alpha for the set of

Probability X Evaluation items was .91 for women, .91 for men, .90 for Democrats, and .81 for Republicans. The correlations between this measure of the evaluative content of affect and the free-response measure were .57 for women, .69 for men, .62 for Democrats, and .81 for Republicans.

Ambivalence of responses. Ambivalence of both beliefs and emotions for both the free-response and the list measures was assessed by a modification of Kaplan's (1972) technique for measuring attitudinal ambivalence. Kaplan defined ambivalence by the following formula:

$$AMB = A_p + |A_n| - |A_p + A_n|$$

where A_p is the sum of responses to the positive items, and A_n is the sum of responses to the negative items. According to this equation, ambivalence consists of the sum of an attitude object's evaluative polarization in a positive direction and the absolute value of its polarization in a negative direction, *minus* the absolute value of its total evaluation (i.e., summed with positive and negative signs maintained). By this technique, target groups perceived as possessing both very positive and very negative attributes (or emotions) received high ambivalence scores; target groups perceived as possessing more uniformly evaluated attributes (or emotions) received lower ambivalence scores.

We modified this technique by representing each belief or emotion entering into the A_p and A_n terms of the equation by its Probability × Evaluation product (i.e., by the product of the probability and the evaluation that each subject assigned to the belief or emotion). The sign of each subject's product for each belief or emotion determined whether it entered the positive or negative term of the equation. Beliefs or emotions for which the product was 0.00 were omitted from ambivalence calculations. Consistent with

our use of averaging equations (see footnote 1), the A_p and A_n terms in Kaplan's equation were represented by the mean values of the summed Probability × Evaluation products.

Results

Our measures were divided into two sets: evaluative responses (i.e., on the attitude, belief, and emotion measures) and ambivalence of responses (i.e., on the belief and emotion measures). Each set was subjected to a Target Group X Sex of Subject multivariate analysis of variance. When multivariate effects were significant (by the F-test approximation of Pillai's V; see Haase & Ellis, 1987), we report also the corresponding univariate effects that attained significance.

On the evaluative measures (see Table 1), the only significant multivariate effect

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Insert Table 1 about here

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was the main effect of target group, $F(12, 939) = 3.47$, $p < .0001$. In the univariate analyses, this main effect was significant on all five measures: attitude, $F(3, 323) = 26.98$, $p < .0001$; free-response beliefs, $F(3, 323) = 4.68$, $p < .005$; list of beliefs, $F(3,323) = 4.55$, $p < .005$; free-response emotions, $F(3, 322) = 3.50$, $p < .05$; and list of emotions, $F(3, 322) = 3.40$, $p < .05$. As shown in Table 1, Newman-Keuls contrasts indicated that subjects evaluated women significantly more favorably than men on the measures of attitude, free-response beliefs, and list of beliefs, but not on the measures of emotions. Although on the attitude measure both men and women were evaluated more favorably than either political party, on the belief measures women and Republicans

were evaluated similarly and more favorably than men (and than Democrats on the free-response measure). Subjects evaluated Republicans more favorably than Democrats on the measures of attitude, free-response beliefs, and list of emotions.

On the ambivalence measures, the only significant multivariate effect was the main effect of target group, $F(12, 924) = 2.10$, $p < .05$. In the univariate analyses, this effect was significant only on the free-response measure of emotions, $F(3, 318) = 3.97$, $p < .01$. Newman-Keuls contrasts showed that subjects were less ambivalent toward Republicans than toward women or men, $ps < .05$. On none of the four measures did subjects differ in the ambivalence they expressed toward women and men.

Sex-of-Subject Effects

In the multivariate analyses, the Target Group X Sex of Subject interaction approached significance on the evaluative measures and the ambivalence measures, $ps < .10$. Univariate analyses showed that this interaction was significant on four dependent variables: free-response beliefs, $F(3, 322) = 2.88$, $p < .05$; free-response emotions, $F(3, 322) = 2.64$, $p < .05$; list of emotions, $F(3, 323) = 2.99$, $p < .05$; and ambivalence of list of emotions, $F(3, 320) = 3.55$, $p < .05$. With the exception of this ambivalence measure, each of these interactions was smaller than the corresponding effect of target group. The only significant tendencies for female and male subjects to react differently to women and men occurred on two of the emotion measures. On the list of emotions evaluative measure, female subjects were significantly more favorable toward men than male subjects were, $p < .005$. On the ambivalence measure derived from the list of emotions, female subjects were significantly less ambivalent towards men than male subjects were, $p < .005$.[5]

Discussion

This research indicated that subjects' evaluations of women were more positive than their evaluations of men. The attitudinal findings strongly supported this conclusion, as did the measures of the evaluative content of subjects' beliefs (or stereotypes) about the sexes. These findings were in fact stronger than those obtained with Eagly and Mladinic's (1989) within-subjects design, as the differences in the evaluation of women and men were somewhat larger in the present study. Moreover, in contrast to the earlier study, the more favorable evaluation of women on the attitude and belief measures was fully intact for male as well as female subjects.

The evaluative content of subjects' emotions was very slightly more positive for women than men, but this difference was not significant. Although subjects' very positive reaction to women thus did not carry over to their emotional responding, our assessment of emotional reactions did not reveal negative sentiments that would corroborate the claim that women are negatively evaluated. Moreover, our analyses of evaluative ambivalence suggested that subjects were not especially ambivalent in their cognitive or affective reactions to women.

The evaluative equivalence of subjects' emotional reactions toward women and men does not invalidate our general conclusion that women were evaluated more favorably than men. Attitudes, which are abstract evaluations assessed by appropriate attitude scales, can be grounded in the domains of beliefs and cognitions, emotions and affect, or even overt behaviors (see Zanna & Rempel, 1988). The closer match that subjects' attitudes showed to their beliefs than to their emotions suggests that their attitudes may have been based primarily on their beliefs. This speculation was supported

by our correlational analyses of attitudes, beliefs, and emotions, which showed stronger relations between subjects' attitudes and the evaluative content of their beliefs than between their attitudes and the evaluative content of their emotions.[6]

Our assessments of emotional responding were exploratory and of course have certain limitations. Asking subjects to write down their emotions requires that they recall their emotions and translate them into verbal responses. Although our list measure of emotional responding required only that subjects recognize their emotions on a list, this task also required the translation of emotions into verbal terms.

In conclusion, our findings suggest that people evaluate women quite favorably as a general social category. Although our subjects evaluated men favorably as well, their evaluations of women were more positive than their evaluations of men when we consider their overall attitudes and the attributes that they ascribed to the sexes. This conclusion was not contradicted by any evidence for covert negativity toward women at the emotional level. Nor did it appear that the overall positivity toward women masked an unusual amount of ambivalence.

The generalizability of our findings to wider populations of respondents is of course not assured. Our subjects were college students at a large midwestern state university and therefore were a younger and better educated sample than U.S. citizens more generally. Yet these students' more positive evaluation of Republicans than Democrats (see Table 1) suggests that they were probably not unusually liberal politically.

How, then, do we reconcile our findings with textbook writers' claims that people evaluate women negatively? At least three possibilities emerge. One important reason for the apparent contradiction no doubt lies in the weaker methods that stereotype

researchers traditionally applied to the evaluation question and the overly strong interpretations that some writers and reviewers have given to these studies. More adequate methods show that women are evaluated especially favorably. A second consideration is that change in the status of women may have caused people to evaluate women more favorably than they did when the first studies of gender stereotypes were conducted (see Werner & LaRussa, 1985). A third possibility is that, despite generally positive attitudes toward the social category of women, certain subtypes and subcategories of women may be negatively evaluated (e.g., Deaux, Winton, Crowley, & Lewis, 1985). The evaluative meaning of gender subtypes remains to be investigated.

Finally, our findings raise fundamental questions about the relation between attitudes and behavior. If people have such favorable evaluations of women as a social category, why do women have a disadvantaged social position, at least when indicators such as wages and promotion are considered? To the extent that attitudes and beliefs are relevant to these issues, treatment of women may have more to do with the specific content of people's beliefs than with the evaluative content of these beliefs. If, as Eagly and Mladinic's (1989) findings suggested, the more favorable evaluation of women than men stems largely from the ascription of positive communal qualities to women (e.g., helpful, gentle, emotional, kind, understanding), these particular qualities may be seen as disqualifying women for certain kinds of work.[7] Although people evidently think that these qualities are wonderful human attributes, they may value them more in close relationships than in highly paid sectors of the work force. Disentangling questions of this sort would be challenging and demands a methodology somewhat different from the one we have used in this research.

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Footnotes

[1]In using probabilities (i.e., expectancies) as weights for the evaluation that subjects expressed on our belief and emotion measures, our method of aggregating evaluative meaning follows the Expectancy X Value method of Fishbein and Ajzen (e.g., 1975). However, contrary to the Expectancy X Value method of adding across the resulting products and consistent with averaging models, we averaged these products by dividing by the number of responses (see Anderson, 1981). Our preliminary analyses revealed that the two methods yielded nearly identical findings.

[2]This measure parallels the belief measure except for the addition of the phrase "among those they had known." This addition reflects our assumption that emotions are experienced primarily during interaction with members of the target group and generalized to the category. In contrast, beliefs are often learned, not only as generalizations from direct and indirect experience with group members, but also as abstractions communicated directly (e.g., by the statement "men are aggressive").

[3]Eagly and Mladinic's (1989) list measure consisted of the gender-stereotypic traits from Spence, Helmreich, and Holahan's (1979) Extended Personal Attributes Questionnaire. A general list of traits was substituted in the present study so that the list of beliefs measure would be as broad as the list of emotions measure (see next subsection). Because our method allows subjects to reject traits that do not describe the target group, any general list should suffice for assessing the evaluative content of their beliefs.

[4]Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p. 71) recommended bipolar scaling of such likelihood ratings when subjects judge beliefs that are not necessarily salient for each individual

subject. In contrast, they recommended unipolar scaling of such ratings when each subject judges the beliefs that he or she has volunteered. The bipolar method allows subjects' responses to express the falsity of listed beliefs, whereas the unipolar method presumes that subjects regard all the beliefs they nominated as true to some extent. We followed Ajzen and Fishbein's logic by using bipolar scaling of likelihoods for our list measures of beliefs and emotions and unipolar scaling for our free-response measures of beliefs and emotions.

[5]The number of beliefs and emotions that subjects listed in the free-response measures was also analyzed. Subjects wrote down significantly more beliefs and emotions for women or men than for either of the political parties, $ps < .0001$. Also, a general tendency for female subjects to write down more emotions than male subjects did, $p < .005$, was especially pronounced when the target group was men, $p < .0001$.

[6]These data are included in a manuscript in preparation that reports correlational analyses for attitudes toward several target groups and social issues.

[7]It is also possible that women's work and products would be devalued under some circumstances, although Swim, Borgida, Maruyama, and Myers's (1989) meta-analysis of research related to this hypothesis found little evidence of such devaluation. However, Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky's (1990) meta-analysis of evaluations of women's and men's leadership behavior suggested a selective devaluation of women under specified circumstances (e.g., when leadership was carried out in stereotypically masculine styles or when leaders occupied male-dominated roles).

Table 1

Mean Evaluations of Women, Men, Democrats, and Republicans

Dependent variable	Women		Men		Democrats		Republicans	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Attitude	2.22_a	0.84	1.73_b	0.98	0.71_d	1.24	1.15_c	1.46
Free-response beliefs	0.97_a	0.80	0.46_b	0.98	0.57_b	1.15	0.89_a	1.20
List of beliefs	0.22_a	0.20	0.12_b	0.21	0.18_{ab}	0.32	0.26_a	0.28
Free-response emotions	0.67_a	0.74	0.65_a	0.94	0.19_b	1.16	0.51_{ab}	1.38
List of emotions	0.15_a	0.30	0.12_a	0.32	-0.01_b	0.32	0.11_a	0.41

Note. Attitude was assessed on a scale that ranged from +3.00 (extremely positive) to -3.00 (extremely negative). The evaluative measures were bounded by theoretical maximums and minimums of +3.00 and -3.00 for the free-response instruments and 1.50 and -1.50 for the list instruments. Means within each dependent variable having the same subscript were not significantly different, $p < .05$ or smaller, by Newman-Keuls contrasts. ns = 81 for women, 82 for men, 82 for Democrats, and 79 for Republicans.